Authentication Bypass Using an Alternate Path or Channel

Demonstrations

The following examples help to illustrate the nature of this weakness and describe methods or techniques which can be used to mitigate the risk.

Note that the examples here are by no means exhaustive and any given weakness may have many subtle varieties, each of which may require different detection methods or runtime controls.

Example One

module foo_bar(data_out, data_in, incoming_id, address, clk, rst_n);
output [31:0] data_out;
input [31:0] data_in, incoming_id, address;
input clk, rst_n;
wire write_auth, addr_auth;
reg [31:0] data_out, acl_oh_allowlist, q;
assign write_auth = | (incoming_id & acl_oh_allowlist) ? 1 : 0;
always @*

  acl_oh_allowlist <= 32'h8312;

assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00) ? 1: 0;
always @ (posedge clk or negedge rst_n)

  if (!rst_n)

    begin

      q <= 32'h0;
      data_out <= 32'h0;

    end

  else

    begin

      q <= (addr_auth & write_auth) ? data_in: q;
      data_out <= q;

    end

  end

endmodule

assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00) ? 1: 0;

The bugged line of code is repeated in the Bad example above. Weakness arises from the fact that the SECURE_ME register can be modified by writing to the shadow register COPY_OF_SECURE_ME, the address of COPY_OF_SECURE_ME should also be included in the check. That buggy line of code should instead be replaced as shown in the Good Code Snippet below.

assign addr_auth = (address == 32'hF00 || address == 32'h800F00) ? 1: 0;

See Also