Improper Access Control for Register Interface

Description

Demonstrations

The following examples help to illustrate the nature of this weakness and describe methods or techniques which can be used to mitigate the risk.

Note that the examples here are by no means exhaustive and any given weakness may have many subtle varieties, each of which may require different detection methods or runtime controls.

Example One

The register interface provides software access to hardware functionality. This functionality is an attack surface. This attack surface may be used to run untrusted code on the system through the register interface. As an example, cryptographic accelerators require a mechanism for software to select modes of operation and to provide plaintext or ciphertext data to be encrypted or decrypted as well as other functions. This functionality is commonly provided through registers.

Cryptographic key material stored in registers inside the cryptographic accelerator can be accessed by software.

Key material stored in registers should never be accessible to software. Even if software can provide a key, all read-back paths to software should be disabled.

Example Two

The example code is taken from the Control/Status Register (CSR) module inside the processor core of the HACK@DAC'19 buggy CVA6 SoC [REF-1340]. In RISC-V ISA [REF-1341], the CSR file contains different sets of registers with different privilege levels, e.g., user mode (U), supervisor mode (S), hypervisor mode (H), machine mode (M), and debug mode (D), with different read-write policies, read-only (RO) and read-write (RW). For example, machine mode, which is the highest privilege mode in a RISC-V system, registers should not be accessible in user, supervisor, or hypervisor modes.

The vulnerable example code allows the machine exception program counter (MEPC) register to be accessed from a user mode program by excluding the MEPC from the access control check. MEPC as per the RISC-V specification can be only written or read by machine mode code. Thus, the attacker in the user mode can run code in machine mode privilege (privilege escalation).

if (csr_we || csr_read) begin
  if ((riscv::priv_lvl_t'(priv_lvl_o & csr_addr.csr_decode.priv_lvl) != csr_addr.csr_decode.priv_lvl) && !(csr_addr.address==riscv::CSR_MEPC)) begin

    csr_exception_o.cause = riscv::ILLEGAL_INSTR;
    csr_exception_o.valid = 1'b1;

  end
  // check access to debug mode only CSRs
  if (csr_addr_i[11:4] == 8'h7b && !debug_mode_q) begin

    csr_exception_o.cause = riscv::ILLEGAL_INSTR;
    csr_exception_o.valid = 1'b1;

  end
end

To mitigate the issue, fix the privilege check so that it throws an Illegal Instruction Exception for user mode accesses to the MEPC register. [REF-1345]

if (csr_we || csr_read) begin
  if ((riscv::priv_lvl_t'(priv_lvl_o & csr_addr.csr_decode.priv_lvl) != csr_addr.csr_decode.priv_lvl)) begin

    csr_exception_o.cause = riscv::ILLEGAL_INSTR;
    csr_exception_o.valid = 1'b1;

  end
  // check access to debug mode only CSRs
  if (csr_addr_i[11:4] == 8'h7b && !debug_mode_q) begin

    csr_exception_o.cause = riscv::ILLEGAL_INSTR;
    csr_exception_o.valid = 1'b1;

  end
end

See Also